A ESSÊNCIA DA VERDADE SEGUNDO ESPINOSA

This article challenges the usual interpretations of Spinoza’s theory of truth. As is well known, Spinoza asserts that the properties of a true idea are either intrinsic or extrinsic to the being of that idea. Commentators generally accept that truth, in Spinoza’s system, must be defined either on the basis of one of these properties or on their conjunction, differing only in the function and relative importance attributed to each in the definition of truth. Against this assumption shared by interpreters, according to which the definition of truth must be constructed out of the properties of the true idea, I will show that such a premise distorts Spinoza’s understanding of truth. This distortion occurs because it does not take into account that a central doctrine of Spinoza’s thought is that a thing is never defined by its properties, but rather that the latter must be deduced from the essence of the thing, which is established prior to them.