A liberdade volitiva na moral kantiana: implicações à bioética do bio-respeito em Fritz Jahr

This article examines the philosophical roots of Immanuel Kant’s idea of freedom and its influence on Fritz Jahr’s construction of bioethics and bioregard. Drawing on the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1783), it explores transcendental freedom and practical freedom (the autonomy of rational will against sensory impulses), pillars of Kantian moral imputability. Jahr’s bioethical Imperative expands the Kantian categorical imperative by extending the status of "end in itself" to all living beings, grounded in: Kantian autonomy (deontology and moral responsibility); capacity for suffering (Leidensfähigkeit); Biopsychology and         ecological            interdependence (neurophysiology). While Jahr destabilizes Kant’s anthropocentrism by including animals and plants as bearers of intrinsic value, he upholds the centrality of human duties in survival contexts (e.g., self-defense). Jahr’s bioethics emerges as a synthesis between Kantian practical freedom and a planetary ethic, anticipating contemporary challenges such as the ecological crisis.