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Aristotle, Protagoras, and Contradiction: Metaphysics Γ 4-6

Evan Keeling

Autor
Evan Keeling
Revista
Journal of Ancient Philosophy
Ano
2013
DOI
10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v7i2p75-99
Páginas
75-99
Idioma
en
2013Evan Keeling. Aristotle, Protagoras, and Contradiction: Metaphysics Γ 4-6. Journal of Ancient Philosophy, p. 75-99, 2013.4

In both Metaphysics Γ 4 and 5 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed to the view that all contradictions are true. Yet Aristotle’s arguments are not transparent, and later, in Γ 6, he provides Protagoras with a way to escape contradictions. In this paper I try to understand Aristotle’s arguments. After examining a number of possible solutions, I conclude that the best way of explaining them is to (a) recognize that Aristotle is discussing a number of Protagorean opponents, and (b) import another of Protagoras’ views, namely the claim that there are always two logoi opposed to one another.