Causação mental e completude da física

This paper deals with the problem of mental causation and, more specifically, with the exclusion argument in favor of physicalism. The exclusion argument, as stated by Kim (2005), establishes that the causal efficacy of mental properties will be comprehensible only if we admit they are reducible to physical properties. My aim is to present an objection to the exclusion argument by criticizing one of its premises, namely, causal completeness of physics. According to this hypothesis, every physical event that has a sufficient cause has also a sufficient physical cause. My objection is based on the fact that laws of physics are true only in highly idealized circumstances (), so that there is no reason to deny that physical events that do not fall under the scope of such laws might have non-physical causes. After all, these laws are applicable only in cases where all the possible causal interferences are modelled in terms of properties which are already recognized. Nevertheless, at risk of vicious circularity, the upholder of physicalism cannot presume there will always be laws of this kind to cover every event of reality, for it is precisely this claim that exclusion argument aims to hold.