Certeza, Filosofia da Psicologia e o Manuscrito 119

Written between 1945 and 1951, Wittgenstein's remarks on certainty and philosophy of psychology deal with a particular concept of certainty regarded as essential to the symbolic and non-symbolic practices and as a matter of attitude. Such a perspective plays a fundamental role in Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology since the objectivity of psychological expressions depends on it. However, the separate editing of the remarks on certainty and philosophy of psychology suggests a divorce between these two subjects, at the same time as it hides the conceptual relationship between both remarks and its history. A close reading of these texts helps us to elucidate its place in Wittgenstein's work and also makes it easier to notice their continuity with Philosophical Investigations, which allows us to see the common elements present in the development of notions that came up with MS 119. It is possible to take the notion of certainty as a common element of the remarks on certainty and philosophy of psychology, which were developed within the framework of the practical conception of meaning and have its origin in Wittgenstein's remarks written in 1937.