CONSIDERAÇÕES SOBRE JUÍZOS PRÁTICOS PERFECCIONISTAS EM NIETZSCHE

The article aims to explain what the meaning of and what consist perfectionist practical judgments by Nietzsche, in spite of the fact that the expression was not used by the philosopher in his texts, so that I also assume a methodological change of interpretation. I start from Nietzsche's distance from the typical problems of modern moral philosophy, such as obligation and moral duty, towards the debate on what good living means. I assume that the notion of self-overcoming can play the role of an intuitive appeal that is strictly formal, with deflated objectivity and instantiated within the scope of plausibility, as well as dispensing with a strong purpose in favour of the procedural dynamics capable of motivating Nietzsche's appeal for constant self-overcoming of man' or ‘greatness’. This procedural dynamic consists of an explanation of the formal structure of perfectionist practical judgments, via a triple meaning: a) a non-cognitive practical process and a theoretical process based on the epistemic virtue of Redlichkeit; b) a mutually dependent feedback between moral performance and space of action; c) in what way the aphorism 12 of the Second Dissertation of Genealogy of moral expresses to a great extent the formal structure of such judgments, via the dynamics of the will to power. I conclude with the explanation that perfectionist practical judgments are produced in an autopoietical manner.