How do skeptics "know"? — A explanation based on two theories of knowledge representation: Dual-representation view of knowledge

The skepticism in the field of epistemology has never lacked advocates and attackers. In order to defend skepticism and answer the question of how skeptics can have knowledge, this article offers a two-step response to the perennial skeptical challenge. First, it strengthens Putnam’s classical “brain-in-a-vat (BIV)” scenario by adding both horizontal variation and vertical simulation-depth, thereby generating an Enhanced-BIV model that systematically defeats the three most influential anti-skeptical strategies—sensitivity, safety, and contextualism. Second, by constructing paradoxical propositions P1: I don’t know that the skeptic’s hypothesis is wrong; and P2: I have perceptual knowledge of the external world, the paper explains how skeptics can nevertheless possess knowledge by distinguishing two independent representational schemes. A representation theory of knowledge about mental states is held when adhering to proposition P1, and a representation theory of knowledge about symbolism is held when adhering to proposition P2. This Dual-Representation View (DRV) dissolves the apparent contradiction without appealing to practical stakes and thereby differs decisively from pragmatic encroachment, knowledge-first contextualism, and structural skepticism. The DRV succeed in explaining how skeptics can “know” while maintaining skeptical intuitions.