Metafísica e Moralidade: os fundamentos da ação segundo a Morale par provision de René Descartes

The present article aims to analyze the existence of a possible contradiction between the morale par provision and the Cartesian philosophical system. To this end, we will first analyze the intertwining of Descartes’s metaphysical theory and moral theory, trying to situate the place of the morale in his philosophical edifice. In this first moment, we will also try to engender the problem here proposed, configured from the question: by adhering to the use of opinion in his morale, would Descartes not open room for a possible paradox between the development of his system of Philosophy and his morale par provision? Then, we will present the content of the morale, analyzing separately each of the three maxims that compose it. This done, we will seek to highlight the rational nature of Cartesian morality. At the end of the paper, we intend to dissipate the apparent paradox by defending the thesis that the content of the three maxims of the morale par provision (moderation, resolution and happiness) confer on it a rational nature, which makes justified the use of opinions, which even without having a value of clarity, distinction and evidence, are still useful for the development of philosophical investigation, which puts the morale in the condition of being an indispensable factor for the development of the Cartesian philosophy.