No limiar do mundo: a posição de Heidegger sobre a diferença entre animais e humanos

Heidegger’s position on the difference between man and animal is often taken as non-scientific or even conservative. This is also Peter Sloterdijk’s view, as defended in his essay Regeln für den Menschenpark. In this paper we intend to show how a due understanding of Heidegger’s statements depends on a proper understanding of the concepts of transcendence, world and world-forming, as explained in Being and Time (1927) and in his The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929/30). By doing so, we may prove that the description offered by Sloterdijk in its Regeln tends to simplify the complex horizon of problems wherein Heidegger moves when he defends a radical difference between man and animal, and thus we intend to show how Sloterdijk’s interpretation of Heidegger is in itself restricted.