On the compatibility of Meinong’s Theory of Objects with Russell’s Theory of Descriptions with regards to nonexistent entities

This paper discusses Meinong’s Theory of Objects and Russell’s Theory of Descriptions in order to claim that, even though both theories are usually seen as rivals, they actually complement each other. We start by briefly explaining the Theory of Descriptions and its main criticism towards the Theory of Objects. Afterwards, we explain the Theory of Objects in great depth, while also providing some particular interpretations of its concepts. Criticism constructive of conceptual categories of the Theory of Objects is then provided, which lays the ground for the compatibility claim we develop in the final part of the paper. We then conclude by claiming that the Theory of Descriptions concerns itself with the logical form of existential judgments expressed by descriptions, whereas the Theory of Objects concerns itself with preconditions of the existence of descriptions, as well as with a taxonomy of descriptive judgments.