Ser objetivo como não-identidade:: sobre as críticas de Marx e Adorno a Hegel

A classical issue in the Hegelian scholarship is the relationship between “method” and “system”, formal-structural and particular, content-related elements. This problem is especially relevant for any attempt of philosophical criticism. If there is something wrong in Hegel, is this related to method, content, or both? Two paradigmatic critics of Hegel’s dialectic are examined here, the young Marx in the 1843 Critique and in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, and Adorno in Hegel: Three Studies and Negative Dialectics. Both share a common premise – the vindication of the objective moment in subjectivity – and conclusion – the exposure of the apologetic outcome of Hegel’s philosophy. However, while Marx’s claim that Hegel reduces objectivity to “self-consciousness” cannot ultimately account for the general structure of Hegel’s objective idealism, but only for some specific contradictions within the system, Adorno’s strategy of a dialectic of identity would seem more likely to fulfill the requirement of an immanent critique of Hegel’s method.