Ser uma pessoa, ser alguém. Os limites do institucionalismo hegeliano
Catherine Colliot-Thélène
- Autor
- Catherine Colliot-Thélène
- Revista
- Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade
- Edição
- 19 / 1
- Ano
- 2014
- DOI
- 10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v19i1p35-61
- Páginas
- 35-61
- Idioma
- pt
It’s generally accepted that Hegel’s political philosophy is institucionalist to the extent that he is not satisfied with justifying the necessity of a political body and exposes its complex articulations with care and precision. While some authors, like Axel Honneth, for example, consider his institucionalism excessive, I think, otherwise, that Hegel’s interest for the concretude of institutions shows the force of his political philosophy. I argue that we can find in Principles of the Philosophy of Right, in two different levels, the traces of a discrete reflection on the limits of the institutionalizable: that of abstract right, object of the first section, and that of the ethical life, which occupies the second one.
