Sobre a unidade da filosofia de Schelling: uma perspectiva sistemática com base no método construtivo (1801-1810)

The aim of this paper is to argue that there is a unity between texts considered to belong to the real part and the ideal part of Schelling's philosophy. Thus, we will demonstrate that the main criticism of his identity system, of not conceiving the subsistence of the finite in the Absolute, did not present itself as a systematic problem. On the contrary, from the beginning, it can be considered incorporated, not as a problem that could be solved through a more consistent argument, but as the foundation of its philosophy, be it of identity or freedom. This can be perceived in the light of the idea of the Absolute as a means where, scientifically, in the real part, all constructions are realized and, in the ideal part, where its essence presented as will of extrapolation from the ground to which all finite things are submitted through their form of being.