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The theory of mental models within a non-axiomatic logic

Miguel López-Astorga

Autor
Miguel López-Astorga
Revista
Prometeica - Revista de Filosofía y Ciencias
Edição
33 / 1
Ano
2026
DOI
10.34024/prometeica.2026.33.21454
Páginas
e21454 (1-12)
Idioma
en
2026Miguel López-Astorga. The theory of mental models within a non-axiomatic logic. Prometeica - Revista de Filosofía y Ciencias, v. 33, n. 1, p. e21454 (1-12), 2026.3

This paper tries to capture the theory of mental models from Non-Axiomatic Logic. The theory of mental models describes people’s natural inferential processes and has strong empirical support. Non-Axiomatic Logic allows building a computer system based on itself. So, if the theory of mental models is right, and Non-Axiomatic Logic can capture the theory, it is possible to build a computer system based on the latter logic coming to conclusions like those of the human natural inferential ability. I attempt to show that with several components of Non-Axiomatic Logic, this logic can represent the basic inferential processes the theory of mental models proposes.