TO BE OR NOT TO BE “SUBTLY” PHILOSOPHICALLY COLONIZED

An often-adopted use of the predicate, “to be colonized”, is one that applies it loosely, not to original Africans or indigenous people enslaved by Europeans or heirs of slaves, but, e.g., to academics who are citizens of former colonies (e.g., Brazil), their philosophical works, etc. But under what conditions one is to do so? And how one can avoid having such predicate been attributable to oneself or one’s works? These issues have not received much attention. While dialoguing with authors associated with decolonial studies, Brazilian, continental and analytic philosophers, this essay aims to contribute to change this situation. It does so by proposing an alternative use of the predicate, “to be ‘subtly’ philosophically colonized”, according to which this predicate is to be applied to philosophical works that have thirteen features described in the essay. It is argued that this alternative use is to be endorsed because it is: precise; exemplified in a detailed way by at least one philosophical work; and “inexplosive” in not suggesting the “explosive” claim that practically all Western philosophical works are colonized by Western metaphysics.