- Autor
- Frederick Rauscher
- Revista
- Kant e-prints
- Edição
- 21
- Ano
- 2026
- DOI
- 10.20396/kant.v21i00.8682620
- Páginas
- e026005-e026005
- Idioma
- en
Loparic’s A Semântica Transcendental de Kant centers on theoretical philosophy but offers a framework for semantic interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy as well. Loparic has explored this application for Kant’s Juridical Semantics and in other works related to practical philosophy. This paper asks the question “what is transcendental” in transcendental semantics in practical philosophy. Universal claims made in practical philosophy involve the rightness of free actions as determined by an a priori moral law. Specific claims also involve particular individuals in physical and social relation to one another. Somewhere between the first type and the second type would be the limit of the transcendental. I assess Loparic’s claims about the Fact of Reason as well as about property in juridical semantics as part of an exploration of the status of the transcendental in practical philosophy.
