Wittgenstein e a expressão de convicções

In a paper titled “Whether Certainty Is a Form of Life,” Elizabeth Wolgast criticizes in two different ways the Wittgensteinian conception of grammatical proposition developed in On Certainty. She accuses Wittgenstein of contradicting, in his later work, certain major theses of Philosophical Investigations insofar as he attributes meaning to certain propositions which are useless in our current language-games, and she also denounces the weakness of the thesis (supposedly developed in On Certainty) that grammatical propositions describe our system of beliefs. I aim at refuting both objections by presenting evidence that grammatical propositions can effectively be used in our current language games, and by demonstrating that one single proposition can, at once, describe the use of words in a language and serve as an example (model) of this use. I seek support in Debrah Aidun’s “Wittgenstein on Grammatical Propositions” in order to perform this investigation on the nature of grammatical propositions, and I try to make some additions to her arguments so that I can bring the later Wittgenstein closer to the research on the speech acts as built up by Austin and Searle.